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A THIRD WORLD
STRATEGY
by Thomas Ehrlich and Catherine Gwin

On October 22 and October 23, 1981, President Reagan and the leaders of 22 major devel-

oped and developing nations will meet in
Canctin, Mexico. Proposed initially by the

Brandt Commission, this North-South summit

meeting offers America's new president a
chance to exercise constructive leadership in
shaping cooperative relations on a range of issues of major importance to the United States
as well as the rest of the world. To do so, the

Reagan administration must first design its
own U.S. program of economic cooperation
with Third World nations that responds to
pressing international development problems
and has the support of the American people.
This program is needed not as an agenda for
summit discussions, but as the framework for

U.S. leadership in those discussions.
So far, the Reagan administration has offered little positive along these lines. Instead, in
its first months in office, the administration has

made plain that it regards U.S. relations with
developing countries as important primarily to

check the spread of Soviet influence. The administration, therefore, has asked Congress to

increase security assistance while reducing
development assistance. It is moving, as Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Jr. testified, "toward a greater emphasis on bilateral rather than

multilateral assistance." It will give special attention to those regimes that most loudly proclaim their pro-American allegiance, regardless
of their commitment to equitable development

in their own countries. This approach is de-

signed to secure U.S. interests by concentrating on short-term political gains viewed
THOMAS EHRLICH, director of the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA), 1979-1981, is
provost and professor of law at the University of Pennsyl-

vania. CATHERINE GWIN, North-South issues coordina-

tor for IDCA, 1980-1981, is the collaborating author of
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Economic Organizations.
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mainly through an East-West prism.
This is a wrong-headed strategy. It will lead
to a reactive foreign policy in which American

adversaries-not clear calculations of U.S.

interests in the Third World-determine U.S.

priorities. It underestimates the fierce determi-

nation of developing nations to be independent. Moreover, the short-term political approach risks tying the United States to regimes

whose people may not support them. When
those regimes fall, as many will, ties with the

United States will collapse with them.
A less reactive and more positive approach
would be consonant with Reagan's determination to reassert American leadership in world
affairs. This alternative approach should offer

an affirmative program of economic cooperation involving sustained support for economic

development in Third World countries. The
program should be based on long-term U.S.
interests in the Third World: economic, politi-

cal, strategic, and humanitarian. Pursuit of

these interests is fundamental to U.S. national

security, not just in its narrow, barbed-wire
sense, but in its broadest dimensions.
Economic stakes. The Third World is a

fast-growing market for U.S. exports. In 1979

$63 billion-35 per cent of total U.S. exports-went to developing countries. This

amount includes $45 billion in manufactured
products-- more than 39 per cent of total U.S.

manufactured exports. In 1979 the United

States sold to developing countries 45 per cent
of its cotton exports, 50 per cent of its wheat
exports, and 74 per cent of its rice exports.
To a growing extent, the United States relies
on developing countries for vital materials. For
example, the United States imports 96 per cent
of its cobalt, 87 per cent of its tin, 86 per cent

of its bauxite used for aluminum, and all its

natural rubber supplies from developing countries. Most important, 41 per cent of the petro-

leum Americans use comes from developing
countries, and about half that amount from
nations outsidethe Middle past. At the end of
1979, U.S. firms had invested close to $48 billion in developing countries, nearly one quarter
of total U.S. foreign direct investment.

Political and strategic interests. The

U.S. need to obtain or maintain base, transit,
146.
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and overflight rights varies significantly from
country to country and region to region. Those

rights are enormously important to U.S.
security in much of the Third World, particularly in the Middle East. The United States
also has a stake in controlling international terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Only the co-

operation of all countries, including those of
the Third World, can resolve these problems.
More fundamental, the United States seeks a
world at peace in which each nation honors the
national sovereignty of other countries and re-

spects the human rights of its own citizens.
Turmoil in Third World countries-likely to
increase as nations try to adjust to the high cost

of energy and slowed growth in the

West-invites outside interference and increases chances of international armed conflict

and pressures for direct U.S. involvement.

Humanitarian concerns. America's

moral values are tested by its response to acute

hunger and deprivation. Assisting Third

World efforts to eliminate extreme poverty
demonstrates U.S. leadership in the world.
Against this background of U.S. national
interests, the diversity of the Third World presents a complex set of challenges for American

policy makers. The economic challenges posed
by newly industrial nations such as Brazil and
South Korea differ from those presented by the
oil-rich, and both sets of problems are distinct

from those raised by strategically important
nations such as Turkey and Egypt. Moreover,
America's interests in all three groups of coun-

tries are distinct from U.S. interests in poor
and politically volatile Third World nations.
Among the last grouping, the United States has

special interests - based on history as well as

geography-in Central America and the

Caribbean.

Supporting Third World Development
American domestic politics and world events

dictate that specific foreign policy priorities

shift from time to time and from administration

to administration. But only by identifying
broad foreign policy objectives that will best
further U.S. interests can policy makers set
sensible priorities. The analysis of U.S. interests outlined above requires that a central ob147.
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jective of U.S. policy toward the Third World

be to encourage Third World economic

growth, openness to international trade and in-

vestment, and an orientation toward cooperation with the United States on global problems

of common concern. This objective ought to
shape the general foreign policy of any administration within which specific country priori-

ties are set. In turn, achieving this objective
demands consistent and coherent long-term
U.S. support for Third World development:
improving the standard of living through increased production of goods and services and
equitable distribution of the benefits.

Development is the underlying requirement
for the continued expansion of U.S. exports

and investment in the Third World and offers

a primary possibility for increasing significantly the world's supply of energy and food. If

an affirmative U.S. development policy is
stifled by East-West myopia, governments that

allow U.S. bases or accept U.S. military aid
risk being branded as American stooges. Only
if developing countries perceive an American
willingness to cooperate on the issue of their
primary concern-their development--can the
United States expect cooperation on its political, security, and economic concerns. Hunger,
rapid population growth, extreme environ-

mental degradation, and rising debts have
reached crisis proportions in many Third

World countries. The United States alone can-

not solve these problems. But the quality and
strength of U.S. leadership will have a major
bearing on the pace and direction of Third
World development.
What are the needs of developing nations to

which the United States should respond as a
means of furthering American leadership and
interests? At his confirmation hearings, Haig
said: "If one thing has become abundantly clear
in the last decade or so, it is that the common-

alty of condition, purpose-and, by extension,

U.S. foreign policy-implied by the term

'Third World' is a myth and a dangerous one
at that." It is true that the economic prob-

lems facing Third World countries vary

enormously-hardly surprising when in 1980
per capita gross national product ranged from
$90 in Bangladesh to $1,510 in Brazil.
148.
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The risks are no less real, however, in ignor-

ing the commonalties and, even more important, the deep sense of unity among those countries, which results from their common need to

develop economically. The coincidence of dramatic oil price rises, sharp increases in the cost

of imported manufactured goods, expanded
interest payments on rapidly accumulating
debts, and slower growth in exports to the in-

dustrial economies have exacerbated their

shared problems. The net oil bill of developing
countries exceeded $60 billion in 1980 and is

expected to double by 1990. Their combined

current account deficit was $80 billion in 1980

and is predicted to exceed $95 billion in 1981.
Some developing nations have financed their
deficits through exceptionally large increases in
borrowing. As a result, the public and publicly

guaranteed external debt of 92 non-oil-producing developing countries rose from $72 bil-

lion in 1973 to $225 billion in 1979.

Economic cooperation with the

Third World is fundamental to

U.S. national security . . in its
broadest dimensions.

In the face of these problems, Third World
nations at every level of development must ad-

just their economies. In the 1960s and 1970s,
many developing countries sought short-term
balance of payments financing in difficult
years. Now they need to adjust to major structural changes in the global economy. These
adjustments must be substantial in order to sustain even moderate rates of growth without
incurring serious payments imbalances or unmanageable external debts. Although needs
will vary from country to country, greater selfsufficiency in energy and food, sensible import

substitution, and promotion of exports have
become essential. The process of redirecting
investment, consumption, and trade will be
long and politically difficult. If developing
countries are to succeed, they must have con-

tinued access to the markets of the industrial

nations, extended adjustment financing, and,
most important, increased investment in food
and energy sectors.
149.
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Major increases in food and agriculture pro-

duction are required, particularly in South
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, to stem growing
dependence on food imports and to help raise
incomes of the poor. With assistance, substan-

tial progress is achievable. Over the next five

years, countries such as Cameroon, Kenya,
Nicaragua, Pakistan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe
should be able to become self-sufficient in

grains. Others, such as Bangladesh, where
complete self-sufficiency by mid-decade is less

likely, can nevertheless substantially reduce
their dependence on imports.

Increased food production in the Third
World directly benefits the United States.
America, which provides 40 per cent of the
world's wheat exports, is by far the largest
grain exporter. But the United States cannot
continue to meet the bulk of growing world
food demands without itself experiencing sharp
increases in the costs of food as well as disruptive price fluctuations as an ever larger share of

U.S. farm output is traded internationally.
Similarly, the development of new Third
World energy resources and better management of existing ones could expand oil supplies

available from countries not belonging to the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and stem the increase of costly oil

imports by developing countries. Such expansion would slow the rise in the costs of import-

ing oil for all nations, including the United
States. Oil and gas production in oil-importing
Third World countries could increase from the
current 2.6 million barrels a day (MMB/D) to 5.9

MMB/D or more by 1990, according to the
World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). The necessary investments are economic at current prices. An
accelerated exploration program begun in the
next few years would lead to even greater production in the 1990s. Coal, now used largely in
India and China, could substitute for about 2.1

MMB/D by 1990; American coal could be used
and thereby increase U.S. exports. Moreover,
improved energy efficiency could save as much

as 2.3 MMB/D. There are also sound prospects
for expanded application of renewable energy
technologies of many kinds, especially in rural

areas. The potential for increased hydropower
150.
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is great; only 10 per cent of feasible potential
has been exploited. Systematic reforestation
can reverse the too rapid decline in the availability of wood used for fuel.

Depending on the speed at which such efforts take place, by 1990 demand for imported

oil by developing countries could grow by 3
MMB/D or fall by as much as~2.5 MMB/D. This

swing of 5.5 million barrels daily will have a
significant bearing on world energy security.
Much smaller swings in the volatile spot market

have led to explosive increases in the general
price level for oil. The size of the developing

countries' oil bills will also affect their abilities

to manage their sharply increased international

debt, $60 billion of which is owed to U.S.

banks.

Limiting population growth is a critical companion issue because of the long-term pressures

of high birth rates on the world's resources,
particularly food and energy. Only one-third
of the couples in developing countries, exclud-

ing China, have reasonable access to family
planning services. This figure can be doubled
over the next decade if donor countries, which
now allocate only 2 per cent of their total aid for

population programs, and developing countries

alike make the effort. Resources devoted

annually to population control-now only
$1 billion, including $450 million in donor
assistance-would have to double by 1985. If
family planning practice then doubled by 1990,

the developing countries would have only 3.3
billion people by the year 2000 instead of 3.8
billion. By 2020, the Third World population

would reach 4.1 billion instead of 5.1 billion.

The United States can make important contributions to the solution of these and other key
development problems, but only through coor-

dination of policies, programs, and resource
transfers. For middle-income countries, much
can be done through trade and investment poli-

cies without large expenditures of public
funds. Scientific-technological cooperation is a

key area in which Third World development
can be promoted by the United States without

significant costs. But for poorer nations, increased development assistance on concessional
terms is also needed. U.S. leadership in dealing
with Third World nations cannot be achieved
151.
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without reversing the downward trend of aid
over the past decade. U.S. development assistance in real terms dropped from $5.5 billion in

1970 to approximately $5.1 billion in 1980.

The United States now ranks 15 out of 17

among developed countries in terms of official

development assistance as a per cent of gross
national product (GNP).
A program is needed that encourages developing countries to commit themselves to equi-

table and sustainable growth, increased open-

ness to international trade and investment, and
cooperation on the foreign policy issues of im-

portance to the United States. Five key areas
need particular attention: private investment,
trade, scientific cooperation, international
financial support, and levels of U.S. aid.
Promoting Private Investment

The U.S. government should actively encourage greater American private sector involvement in Third World development. New
measures are needed to expand U.S.? private
investment in developing countries and to en-

hance activities by American businesses that
increase the development benefits of their

investments.

Much of the controversy surrounding
foreign investment in developing countries had
subsided by the end of the 1970s. Many devel-

oping countries indicate they want more, not
less, U.S. investment. These countries have
become increasingly sophisticated in designing
policies to channel multinational corporate resources into areas where they are most wanted

and in obtaining the most out of what multinational corporations have to offer. Similarly,

American corporations have discovered new
arrangements for doing business in developing

countries consistent with the national aspirations of those countries. But the full potential

of U.S. private sector involvement in promoting development to the benefit of investors,
host, and home country is far from achieved. In

the past decade, U.S. investment in developing
countries, excluding the petroleum sector,
grew at an annual rate of 29 per cent compared

with a rate of only 16 per cent in developed
countries. But developing countries still account for only one quarter of total U.S. foreign
152.
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direct investment, and 10 developing countries
attracted 70 per cent of the share.

U.S. private investment in Third World petroleum, mining, and smelting-areas of vital
interest to the United States-lagged behind
such investment in developed countries in the
1970s. Despite the resource potential of the
developing world, U.S. investment in developing country petroleum activities increased only

$587 million from 1970 to 1980; in developed

countries it increased $20 billion. In Third

World mining and smelting, U.S. investment
grew by $300 million; in developed countries'
operations it grew by nearly $1.5 billion.
By almost any measure, the Third World
remains underexplored and its resources underdeveloped. Although 40 per cent of the
world's prospective oil-bearing terrain is in
non-OPEC developing countries, their share of
proven oil reserves in 1980 was only 11.5 per
cent of the world total. As of January 1978, the

density of drilling in the United States was
more than 100 times as great per square mile of
potential oil-bearing terrain as in the non-OPEC

developing countries, and nearly 800 times as
great as in Africa. In mining, a recent survey of

U.S. and Canadian mining companies indicates that 80 per cent of their exploration ex-

penditures have been in developed countries,
despite economically accessible ore in the developing world.
A number of existing U.S. programs affect
U.S. business in Third World countries, but
few of those programs have a strong development focus. The Export-Import Bank provides
export financing, credit guarantees, and insurance, but not with a view to promoting devel-

opment. Bank activities in 1980 totaled $4.4
billion in loans, about half of which went to
developing countries, and $8 billion in guar-

antees and insurance.

The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) primarily provides political risk in-

surance, loans, and loan guarantees to U.S.
investors. It has put special emphasis on
energy-related investments in recent years, but
it still has an ambiguous commitment to devel-

opment as an objective. In 1980 OPIC insured
94 projects and made commitments to finance
18 projects in 39 countries. Its insurance cover153.
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age totaled $1. 1 billion; its loan and guaranty commitments amounted to $184 million.
The new Trade and Development Program
(TDP) funds project identification efforts, feasi-

bility studies, and reimbursable technical assistance. The focus of this program is on encouraging U.S. exports and investment abroad
as well as on supporting development. In 1981
TDP was involved in 58 projects in 26 countries. Its proposed 1982 budget is $7 million.
Finally, through the housing guarantee program of the Agency for International Develop-

ment (AID), U.S. private lenders provide
long-term loans-$174 million in 1980-for
low-cost housing in developing countries. Like
TDP, this program remains small.
Expansion of these bilateral investmentpromotion programs could occur at little cost in
terms of budgetary outlays, for they are essentially self-sustaining over time. The Carter ad-

ministration was reluctant, however, to support expansion, in part because of the difficulty

of proving that a company would not have
made a particular investment without a govern-

ment guarantee. In addition, the administration did not want to risk heightened hostility

to private foreign investment in some developing countries. In a speech explaining the
Carter administration's approach, Richard N.
Cooper, under secretary of state for economic

affairs, stated that the United States "should

maintain policies that do not bias the corporate

decision-making process between foreign and
domestic investment one way or another."

More assertive efforts to promote both
development and private U.S. investments
would affirm U.S. support for greater private
sector involvement in the development of inter-

ested Third World countries. The support
would not bias corporate decision making.
Rather, it would help correct the current condi-

tions that make it difficult for those countries

to attract private investment. In a campaign
speech in October 1980, Reagan specifically
recognized the importance of that investment,
particularly in Africa.

To achieve this aim, an active informational

effort should be launched to identify opportunities that would have a high development
impact and to help host countries interest U.S.
154.
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private investors. For example, technical assistance in designing national investment policies
could help attract investment and direct it for
host-country needs.

The U.S. government should establish a
business advisory council to exchange views
with officials on the scope and direction of
U.S. development policies and to consider innovative ways of promoting greater American

private sector participation in development.

The U.S. bilateral economic assistance pro-

gram in developing countries should also help
design and fund activities that involve both

local and U.S. businesses, e.g., training and
research programs. While strengthening its as-

sistance programs, the United States should
signal its intention to negotiate, for the first
time, bilateral investment treaties with inter-

ested developing countries. The purpose of
these treaties would be to improve the investment climate by providing a floor of legal rights
for foreign investors. The primary U.S. objec-

tive of the treaties would not be to promote
development; nonetheless, an improvement in
the investment climate combined with invest-

ment assistance for interested developing countries could contribute substantially to development. Moreover, the United States should con-

tinue to review its tax laws and follow closely
recent reforms in those laws in order to enact,
if necessary, further reforms that can encourage foreign investment.

Expanding Trade
The United States should also take affirma-

tive actions to strengthen trade ties with devel-

oping countries.1 Over the past decade, developing countries as a group have become a
fast-growing market for U.S. exports, far out-

pacing developed countries, and developing
countries have made impressive gains in the
growth of their exports to the United States.

From 1970 to 1979, their exports of nonpetroleum products to the United States

jumped from $8.5 billion to $42 billion, an
average annual rate of growth of 19.5 per cent.

Manufactured exports alone from developing
'This section draws heavily on Henry Berghoef, "Recent
Developments in U.S. Trade Policy Affecting Developing

Countries" (1981).

155.

This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Wed, 25 May 2016 14:49:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

countries increased from $3.5 billion to $26.4
billion. Barriers to developing country exports
have been reduced, most recently through im-

plementation of the U.S. Generalized System

of Preferences (GSP), which allows many

manufactured and agricultural products from
developing countries to enter the U.S. market
duty free, and as a result of agreements reached

in the recently concluded Tokyo Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations.

Yet substantial trade barriers remain.

Though GSP has improved the developing

countries' access to U.S. markets, the exclusion

of a number of exports important to eligible
countries has seriously limited its liberalizing
effect. Some products, including footwear, tex-

tiles, and apparel, are legally excluded from
GSP. Others are barred if the president determines that they are import sensitive. The effect

of GSP is also limited by competitive need
criteria, which render a specific product from a

country ineligible for GSP treatment if in any

year the country's exports exceed $25 million
(in 1974 dollars) or if the country accounts for

more than 50 per cent of U.S. imports of the
product.
Agreements made in the Tokyo negotiations
provide some expanded trade opportunities for

developing countries, but the Third World is
resentful about things not done. As a result of

the Tokyo round, the major industrialized
countries will reduce their tariffs by an average
of 25 per cent on a range of items exported by

developing nations. New codes on subsidies,
government procurement, standards, import
licensing, and customs valuation will provide a
more open and stable trading environment for

all nations. Furthermore, the Tokyo round
establishes a permanent legal basis for special,
more favorable treatment of developing countries. The average tariff cuts affecting those
countries, however, were less than those affecting products of industrial countries. In the case

of the United States, the average tariff on
developing countries' dutiable industrial products is almost twice as high as the average tariff

on products from the European Community
and Japan, and more than three times as high as
on those from Canada.

This gap is largely because of the greater
156.
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percentage of industrial imports from develop-

ing countries that were excluded from any
tariff cuts in the Tokyo round, the extraordinarily high tariffs that the United States will

continue to maintain on textiles and apparel,
and the relatively high duties remaining in a
few other industrial sectors in which develop-

ing countries predominate. Moreover, agricultural products from developing countries that

compete with U.S. products carry relatively
high duties -exceeding, on average, the duties
applied to agricultural imports from industrial

countries. Attention to these products in the
Tokyo round was minimal.

The Third World is resentful

about things not done ... [in] the
Tokyo round.
In the area of textiles and apparel, the devel-

oping countries' single largest manufactured
export, the trend has been to toughen import
restrictions in recent years. Almost all of the
trade in these items with Third World coun-

tries is governed by the multifiber arrangement

(MFA). Under the MFA, the United States cur-

rently maintains restrictive bilateral agreements with 23 textile and apparel suppliers, all

of them developing countries except Japan.
Four of these agreements were entered into
since the beginning of 1978. Virtually all others

have been renegotiated over the past three
years to restrict imports even further. When
multilateral textile arrangements were first
negotiated in the early 1960s, they were to pro-

vide for orderly growth in world textile and

apparel trade. But with U.S. industry and
labor pressuring for even more restrictive
agreements, the government has done little to
insure that the domestic industry will make real

adjustments.
In the context of continued slow growth in
the United States and in other industrial coun-

tries, prospects do not appear good for any new

U.S. trade initiatives, unless the executive

branch provides a major push. A program for
economic cooperation should confront this
problem.
The United States should take the lead in

seeking quick agreement on a global trade
157.
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pledge that would commit both developed and
developing countries, in accordance with their
levels of development, to restrain protectionist

pressures. Furthermore, the United States
should intensify efforts to achieve an agreement on a safeguards code aimed at strengthening international discipline over import restric-

tions. It should press to insure that the codes
negotiated in Tokyo are effectively implemented and that the new dispute settlement
and surveillance mechanisms function effec-

tively. Inasmuch as various provisions of the
new codes involve considerable ambiguity, the
United States should urge interpretations that
favor developing countries whenever possible.
In addition, the executive branch should
request new authority from Congress to enable
the executive branch to engage in bilateral tariff

negotiations with individual developing countries after 1981, when the current limited authority expires. These talks will have to be real

negotiations, with concessions made by both
sides, if progress is to be made in further reduc-

ing U.S. trade barriers to developing country
exports. Most products on which the United
States maintains high tariffs are sensitive ones
in labor-intensive and unionized industries.

Currently, the bulk of U.S. imports of these
products comes from the more advanced developing countries. Many of these countries themselves maintain high barriers to trade that now

can be eliminated without unduly compromising their ability to manage their own economies. Indeed, some of these countries, such as

South Korea, are moving toward more open
trade policies as they reach the limits of import
substitution and see the benefits of increased

domestic competition and an open international trading system.
Finally, the United States should commit itself to renewal of both its GSP, which expires in

1985, and the MFA, which is currently under
renegotiation. The United States should also
expand the product coverage of its GSP and lift

the competitive need ceiling on exports from
the poorest countries while gradually phasing

out some of the most advanced developing
countries from the list of GSP-eligible countries. In the negotiations on a renewal of the
MFA, the United States should recommit itself
158.
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to the trade liberalizing spirit of the original
MFA and press other industrial countries to do

the same. In that context, the United States

should accept more liberal provisions for lowincome suppliers.
Two premises underlie this set of trade recommendations. The United States should

commit itself to further trade liberalization as

part and parcel of renewed growth, and it

should demand in return that as Third World

countries develop, their own commitment to an

open trading system will also grow.
Science and Technology
The United States should increase its efforts

to provide scientific and technological assis-

tance to the Third World countries. Science

and technology will make significant contributions to future productivity gains and growth in

the United States; they can and should do the
same in the Third World. Cooperation in this
area could, in particular, enhance U.S. relations with those more advanced developing
countries, such as Brazil, that no longer need
bilateral concessional assistance but are impor-

tant to the United States for economic or strategic reasons.

Long-term, high-level academic and technical training programs in U.S. institutions are
among the most effective means the United
States has to influence future foreign leaders
and the development process. Moreover, by
expanding educational opportunities in this
country for Third World students, the United

States would take advantage of the consider-

able underutilized capacity that will result
from the 25 per cent decline in American 18year-olds by the end of the decade. One way to

do this is to develop a much larger and more

active foreign scholarship program. The

United States used to make a major financial
commitment in this area, and the benefits were

enormous. Many of the current leaders in
Indonesia, for example, were trained in the
United States under government-sponsored
programs. In the 1970s, however, such programs stagnated.

Currently, U.S.-sponsored training is based
primarily on academic merit, focuses on grad-

uate and postgraduate academic studies, and
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runs for short periods (one month or so for the

majority to two years at most). The two most
important programs that bring students to the

United States-AID's participating training
program and academic exchanges sponsored
by the International Communications Agency
(ICA) -did not grow at all in the 1970s, despite

the fact that the number of countries involved

increased from 69 to 98. In fact, the number of

people supported by AID's program dropped
from 7,278 in 1976 to 6,065 in 1980. Students
involved in ICA exchanges declined from 1,086
in 1970 to 1,032 in 1979. The Carter budget for

1982 would have allowed for a 20 per cent increase in ICA exchanges; this proposed increase

was axed in the Reagan budget revisions.
The U.S. approach contrasts sharply with

that of the Soviet Union. The Soviets view

academic and technical programs as an important, low-cost facet of their relations with

developing countries. Students from Third
World countries are included at undergraduate

levels; the program is designed to meet the

needs of those countries for skilled technicians

and involves, generally, long periods of study
(four to six years is normal). The Soviet program has been growing steadily. In 1970 about

12,500 students from developing countries
were trained in the Soviet Union. By 1978 this

figure had more than doubled.
Nowhere is the comparison between the two
efforts more striking than in Central America

and the Caribbean. U.S. programs provide
about two-thirds as many places as are available

in the USSR and Eastern Europe. When the
large Cuban effort is added, the comparison
becomes overwhelmingly disproportionate.
U.S. programs also are of shorter duration and

scattered in coverage; many countries receive
little attention and some, none at all. U.S. efforts, moreover, exclude younger, less affluent

students, a group which the Soviets and their
allies carefully cultivate.

Strengthening Multilateral Institutions

The United States should reaffirm its support for the key international financial institu-

tions, including expansion of their lending

programs. Among the U.N. development
agencies, the United Nations Development
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Programme and the United Nations Children's

Fund also deserve particular support. U.S.
support for all these institutions is important
not only in and of itself, but also in mobilizing
the resources of other countries, including the
rich oil nations.

In the last several years, the United States
has supported measures to expand the financing activities of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), including the establishment of a
$10 billion supplementary financing facility
(SFF). The United States also endorsed the concept of establishing a subsidy account to reduce

interest payments on SFF borrowings by lowincome countries. In addition, the United

States has approved changes in IMF policies
that greatly expand member countries' access
to IMF resources and extend the period of adjustment and repayment associated with IMF
financing. These measures should encourage
developing countries to undertake necessary
adjustments before their economic problems
reach crisis proportions. As a result, the likeli-

hood of severe political and economic disruptions should be substantially lessened.
The United States, however, has opposed
giving special attention to development needs
in the operations of the IMF. The U. S. position

has been that the IMF is not a development
institution. The position is correct in the sense
that the IMF ought not to be providing medium-

to long-term development financing. Nevertheless, the United States should support a
number of proposed reforms that would make
the IMF more responsive to the economic problems of developing countries. Three are of particular importance.

First, the United States should support an
agreement to fund adequately a subsidy account to help low-income countries reduce
their interest payments not only on drawings
from the existing SFF, but also on other funds

derived from future IMF market borrowing.
The funding could come from profits from the
sale of remaining IMF gold or from direct gov-

ernment contributions.

Second, to insure adequate levels of funding

under the IMF's revised conditionality guidelines, the United States should endorse the
fund's entry into new borrowing arrangements
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or IMF borrowing from private capital markets.

Third, Washington should support an expanded role for Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)
and a change in the formula for distributing
SDRs favorable to low-income countries. The

IMF now distributes new SDRs on the basis of

members' voting quotas. This allotment system generally provides the most new liquidity
to those members that need it least. Although
the total amount of new liquidity to be created

should be based on the liquidity needs of the
system as a whole, a new distribution formula,
more favorable to developing countries, should

be established.

Of equal, if not greater, importance to devel-

oping countries is the future of U.S. support
for the multilateral development banks (MDBs),

including the World Bank and the three regional development banks in Africa, Asia, and
Latin America. The MDBs today are the largest

source of official development capital and are
major sources of development expertise. In
1980 the four MDBs loaned $15 billion to devel-

oping countries. Of this amount, $12.5 billion

came from the World Bank.

Initial statements by the Reagan administration cast substantial doubt on continued strong

U.S. support for the MDBs. These statements,

echoed by some members of Congress, are
based on judgments that MDB loans do not reflect U.S. political and security interests in the

Third World; that the MDBs support radical
regimes that follow anti-Western economic
policies; that loans from the MDBs promote
development of large public sectors and public
sector enterprises at the expense of private sec-

tor development; and that MDB lending competes with, rather than acts as a catalyst for,
private investment and private lending.
These judgments are wrong on the particular
points at issue. More important, they seriously
underestimate both the value of U.S. participation in the MDBs and the adverse consequences

of a reduction in U.S. support.

It is true that U.S. contributions to the mul-

tilateral development banks are not responsive
to short-term maneuvering for U.S. diplomatic
advantage. They do not reward, for example, a
country for voting with the United States on an

issue before the U.N. Security Council. The
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history of the past two decades demonstrates,
however, that any attempt to use foreign aid to

buy allies on issues of immediate concern will
ultimately fail. Even if a country's friendship is
for sale in the short run, it will be enormously

expensive. The costs of shoring up even a
single nation's economy can be staggering.

Any attempt to use foreign aid to
buy allies on issues of immediate
concern will ultimately fail.
U.S. contributions to the multilateral devel-

opment banks do support American interests,
although not always in immediate terms. Almost all the biggest borrowers of MDB funds are

key developing countries from a U.S. foreign

policy perspective. Some are important as
major markets for U.S. goods and services;
others are strategically important. Most have
expanding private sectors and, increasingly,
open trade and investment policies. The major
role of all the MDBs has been to finance the

infrastructure development - roads, dams,
ports, and electrification -that is essential to
private enterprise.
In addition, the MDBs have an important role
in increasing the productivity of the many millions of farmers in Third World countries and

developing the human skills needed by a productive management and labor force. In making loans for economic development purposes,
the MDBs follow policies and procedures designed to promote growing, open economies.
The funds that the MDBs provide to these
countries are obtained with a relatively small

direct U.S. budget expenditure. The World
Bank has total outstanding loan commitments
of $51.5 billion. Of that amount, the United
States provided only $703 million. The rest

came from other donors and from direct bor-

rowings in the world capital markets. Although
the leverage of other MDBs is not as dramatic, it
is substantial.

A reduction in U.S. support for the MDBs
would have serious effects not only on develop-

ing countries but also on American exports,
American banks, and U.S. relations with the
Western allies. Developing countries face increasing oil import bills, sluggishness in their
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traditional export markets, and high levels of

indebtedness made worse by high interest
rates. Without MDB assistance, their ability to

import U.S. goods will suffer further. U.S.
banks have more than $60 billion outstanding
in loans to the Third World. All of the Western

allies also have important economic ties with

developing countries. They are more de-

pendent than the United States on exports to

Third World countries and on oil and other

raw materials imported from those countries.

In 1979 and 1980, the United States supported a new World Bank structural adjustment lending program and, with other devel-

oped countries, asked the World Bank to

consider ways of expanding and making more
effective the funding of energy development in
Third World countries. If the World Bank is to
finance these new endeavors as well as meet the

loan requests of one of its newest members,
China, the bank will need additional funds well

beyond those that can be raised by its 1980
general capital increase. One possible solution
worth serious consideration would be to raise

the bank's borrowing-to-capitalization ratio
from 1:1 to 2:1, as urged in the Brandt Commission report. The bank's borrowing, and
thus lending, capacity could be doubled over
time, without requiring increased legislative
appropriations.
The United States, however, is now in arrears in meeting its agreed contributions to the
current replenishments and capital increases to
the World Bank and to the three regional development banks. This failure to meet negotiated
commitments has damaged the leadership position of the United States in world affairs and

put a damper on the kind of international development cooperation called for by present

world conditions. If the United States is to

reassert its leadership in the development field,
it must not only meet its resource commitments
to the multilateral financing institutions, but it

must also accept greater participation by developing countries in international economic
decision making.
Many analysts now doubt the ability and
willingness of the private commercial banks to
handle fully the recycling of OPEC oil revenues.
One alternative is for oil-exporting countries to
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put more of their financial surpluses into the
international financial institutions. Their will-

ingness to do this depends, in large part, on
their obtaining a corresponding increase in
decision-making power in the institutions.
A relatively new international organization,
the International Fund for Agricultural Devel-

opment (IFAD), suggests a possible approach.
IFAD, inaugurated in 1977, is designed to provide loans and grants for agricultural develop-

ment in the poorest Third World countries.
IFAD has three categories of members: developed nations, OPEC countries, and non-oilproducing developing countries. Each of the
three groups has an equal share of votes.
The United States should make these efforts

to strengthen the international financial institu-

tions, but only if developing countries will
share responsibility for the effective function-

ing of these mainstays of international economic cooperation. Thus, oil exporting coun-

tries with large capital surpluses should
provide increased development financing; oilimporting developing countries should offer
progress on issues of mutual concern, including

energy, food production, and population control; and the more advanced developing countries should agree to a phased transition out of
the ranks of aid recipient.

Reversing a Downward Slide
Finally, the United States should pledge to
increase its concessional assistance for develop-

ing countries in direct proportion to GNP
growth. As the U.S. economy grows, U.S. aid
would grow accordingly. The downward trend
of aid levels in the 1970s would be broken. By
promising that a share of American economic
growth would be used to promote growth in
developing countries, the United States would
acknowledge increasing interdependence with
developing countries. How might this work?
Even under the most unfavorable estimates,
the U.S. GNP is projected to grow by at least 2

per cent annually over the next four years.
Developing countries should receive through

U.S. foreign economic assistance the same

2 per cent share of GNP increases averaged over

the preceding three years. The 1983 increase
would, therefore, be 2 per cent of the average
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of GNP increases in 1980, 1981, and 1982.
Using this formula and conservative estimates
of 2 per cent annual GNP growth between 1982

and 1985, the foreign assistance budget would
rise from about $8.6 billion in 1982 to $14.4
billion in 1985 at current prices. This change
would represent an increase from 0.28 per cent

of U.S. GNP in 1982 to 0.35 per cent in 1985.
If, however, GNP growth averages 3.5 per cent
a year, then the 1985 foreign assistance budget

would rise to $16.7 billion in current prices.

The United States coulcfuse at least some of

the additional money to assist key low-income

countries in the identification and design of
projects to be financed by the private sector or

by the MDBs. The United States would be able
not only to concentrate additional resources on

the poorest countries of special importance to
it, but also use its bilateral assistance to help
those countries obtain the far greater resources

of the MDBs and private investors. In any
event, the U.S. bilateral aid program should
continue the pattern adopted in 1979 of increas-

ing concentration on the developing countries
where the need is most severe, the potential for

effective development is greatest, and develop-

ment is most directly in U.S. interests.
This proposed program for economic cooperation constitutes a basic core of actions that

the United States should undertake in Third

World countries to promote U.S. interests and

leadership. It would associate the United
States with processes of economic development

that enjoy the support of Third World people
and, in turn, enhance their interests in strong,

stable, and mutually beneficial relations with

the United States. Few of the recommenda-

tions would involve large increases in government expenditures. All would undoubtedly
run up against some domestic opposition; but
all parts of the program would also have domes-

tic constituents. Opinion polls indicate broad
public support for an assertion of constructive

U.S. leadership in the world, and Reagan has
said he accepts the challenge. The program

outlined here is essential to that task.
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